Abstract
Introduction
The rising importance of South-South foreign direct investment (FDI), or FDI from developing countries to other developing countries, was heralded in United Nations (2006) , and that new importance was emphasized by the fact that outflows from developing and transition countries were less affected by the 2009 contraction in FDI flows than those from developed countries (United Nations, 2010, p. xix) .
2 FDI flows to developed countries suffered the worst decline, possibly because affiliates in developed countries were more dependent on reinvested earnings as a source of growth in FDI stocks than affiliates in developing countries, particularly those relatively new ones owned by other developing countries. A recent UNCTAD World Investment
Report (United Nations, 2010) predicts that the "… shift in foreign investment inflows towards developing and transition economies is expected to accelerate…" (p. 3).
Considering the importance of FDI from developing to other developing countries, it is
unfortunate that most studies examine FDI between developed countries (North-North FDI) or FDI from developed to developing countries (North-South FDI). This paper contributes to the literature by examining South-South FDI in Developing East Asia.
All firms, whether from South or North, need to have firm specific assets to compete with local firms in foreign markets. There are many reasons why the competition might be more difficult for firms from the South than for those from the North. For instance, South firms tend to have weaker brand names and inferior technologies (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008) .
Moreover, host governments sometimes favor North FDI through subsidies and licenses because of the belief that they bring in more advanced technology and have access to a wider international distribution network (Stopford and Strange, 1992) .
However, it has been suggested that some other factors actually favor South FDI, at least in developing countries. More precisely, developing countries are typically characterized by relatively poor institutions. A lack of market mechanisms, poorly developed contracting and property rights, and poor infrastructure are obstacles that firms in developing countries need to address and overcome. The poor home market institutions will shape the business practices and organization of the firms. Once the developing country firms invest in other developing countries, their previous experience of working in a similar environment might turn out to be an advantage (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008) . The business practices and distribution networks will be well adapted to other developing countries.
Thus a source of relative disadvantage -having a home country with poorly developed institutions -becomes a source of relative advantage when the MNE moves into other countries with poor institutional environments (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008, p.975) .
Firms from developed countries are presumably less experienced at working in ill functioning markets and might therefore face more difficulties in entering into and growing in developing countries. Differences in home country conditions might also lead to differences in their effects on the host economies. For instance, similarities in home and host countries in terms of culture and level of technology development might increase the potential for spillovers to local firms.
The main reason for differentiating North-South from South-South FDI in Developing
East Asia is to learn how they differ, and how any differences, if we find them, determine the way they affect their host countries. This paper attempts to measure the size of South-South FDI and the trends in it, and the characteristics of the investing countries and the investments themselves. It also summarizes the findings of studies in individual countries of the effects of these investments. The studies of individual countries will be used to try to find some consensus on differences between South-South FDI and North-South FDI. Among the comparisons of the two types of FDI we will try to summarize, will be findings about their industrial composition, their effects on their host countries and their host-country firms' productivity, wages, and employment, and how these differ across industries. The East Asian countries that are covered in the different parts of the paper differ depending on data availability and the coverage in previous literature.
3
We find that a large share of FDI in developing East Asia comes from developing countries in the region. There are signs of an increased importance of this South-South FDI but data problems make it difficult to detect the exact trend. We also find South-South FDI to differ substantially from North-South FDI: the investing firms tend to locate their affiliate operations in more labor intensive industries, and their affiliates tend to be smaller in size and with lower productivity. The effects on the local economy from South-South and North-South FDI seem to differ depending on the country in question. -- Table 3 OFCs, and the ultimate source of the FDI is therefore uncertain. It is therefore also uncertain whether the share of countries in the South as sources of FDI into Singapore increased at all.
Trends in South-South FDI
An unusual set of inward FDI data is produced by Hong Kong, including a breakdown of inward FDI from offshore financial centers, identifying "FDI from Non-Operating Companies in
OFCs Set Up by Hong Kong Companies for Indirect Channeling of Funds" (Table 4 ). Since these inflows are from affiliates of Hong Kong companies themselves, their inclusion obscures the sources of inward direct investment. The data excluding these inflows exhibit a sharper decline in the share of FDI inflows from the North and a corresponding increase in the growth of the share of FDI inflows from the South.
-- Table 4 about here--
Some notes on data problems
There is some evidence that South-South FDI has become a larger part of the FDI universe, despite the weakness of much of the data from lack of reporting and from deliberate obscuring of the sources and direction of investment. The compilers, as well as the users, of the balance of payment data on FDI are aware that the flows often do not originate in the countries to which they are attributed, do not enter the countries that are their supposed destinations, and if they do enter the declared destinations, do not remain in those destinations. They often represent bookkeeping entries in corporate accounts, but no economic activity such as the employment of labor, the production of goods and services, or the installation of capital assets.
For instance, UNCTAD's 2006 World Investment Report, which was focused on SouthSouth FDI, included a "cautionary note" (United Nations 2006, p. 106) that pointed out some of the problems. For one thing, few developing countries report any data on outward FDI. Among those that do, important ones report their outward FDI as going to offshore financial centres, which, when they transship the funds, are then reported as the sources of the investment.
Furthermore, "…in some developing and transitional economies (e.g. China, Hong Kong (China), and the Russian Federation) a significant amount of FDI takes the form of round tripping" (p. 106). In that case, the investment leaves the home country and returns to it quickly, never leaving the control of the home country firm, and never being used outside the home country.
Another problem is that FDI flows and stocks, as defined by the International Monetary Fund, include FDI by sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), mainly based in developing countries.
While purchases of ownership shares of 10% or more (United Nations 2010, p. 14, assumes that investments other than mergers and acquisitions are "extremely limited") meet the IMF definition of FDI in terms of the extent of ownership (10%), they are more akin to portfolio investment than to private FDI with respect to the characteristics ascribed to FDI in the literature.
These include the parent firm's exploitation of its firm-specific advantages, acquired by experience in the industry, by production in the home country, and by R&D or advertising. The
SWFs typically have no firm-specific advantages except large amounts of capital, they do not generally seek control of firms they invest in, and move in and out of industries in pursuit of higher returns (or smaller losses), much as private equity firms do. The problems with balance of payment data on FDI limit the conclusions that can be reached with respect to sources of aggregate stocks and directions of flows. Partly for this reason, we focus most of our discussion below on data on real economic activities rather than on data on financial flows.
How do North-South and South-South FDI in Asia Differ?

Determinants of FDI
Few studies on determinants of FDI take in to account whether the host country is a developed or a developing country. At best, existing studies examine if there are differences in determinants between FDI from North and South, and not how determinants of South-South FDI differ from determinants of North-North or North-South FDI. For instance, Ma and Van Assche (2011) examine determinants of FDI from OECD and non-OECD countries. Their results suggest that FDI from OECD countries is negatively affected by institutional differences between home and host countries. They also find economic differences to be negative influences on FDI, which they interpret as a negative effect from differences in consumer preferences. FDI from non-OECD countries is only affected by economic differences and not affected by differences in institutions. 6 Hattari and Rajan (2009) 
Industry distribution of FDI
A study of manufacturing in Thailand in the 1990s by Ramstetter (2004) divided foreign plants into those from the EU, the U.S. and Japan, which we call North here, those from Singapore, Taiwan, and Korea, which we call South, and an "other" group, which we cannot identify. The numbers of plants that are part of the FDI from the two regions show relatively high representation of FDI from the South in Textiles, Apparel, Rubber products, metal products, and some machinery, but FDI in Motor vehicles and in Chemicals and products was predominantly from the North.
6 See e.g. Fung et al. (2009) and Hill and Jongwanich (2009) Hong Kong is ranked as number 16, both higher than the median developed country. Taiwan is ranked 32nd and Korea as 36, both not far from the developed-country median. Malaysia is ranked 60. All of these countries are at a far higher level of development than the host country:
Indonesia is ranked as number 110 in terms of income per capita. A recent paper by Peter Petri (2011) refers to this pattern as "Asian exceptionalism", in that intra-Asian FDI "…is dominated by flows from high-technology economies to medium technology economies, while FDI elsewhere primarily consists of flows among high technology economies."
The distribution of North FDI in Indonesia is much more skewed than the South distribution. Japanese plants account for one third of total FDI and two thirds of North FDI in Indonesia. Investments from western countries are not very important. The next largest home country is the US with only about four percent of total foreign plants in Indonesia. Germany, Belgium/Luxemburg, and Switzerland have each about two percent of the foreign plants.
-- Table 5 about here-- Singapore is owned by regional offices of foreign owned Singaporean companies, a factor that could explain some of the similarities with the distribution of plants from the North. Malaysia differs from all other countries by its high concentration in the Wood Product industry.
-- Table 6 about here--Looking at the results in other studies, among investors in China, according to Abraham et al. (2010) , those from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan (South-South investors) are particularly present in such "…labour-intensive sectors as …Apparel and other textile products…".
Investors from other countries are predominant in Chemicals and allied products, Industrial machinery and equipment, Electronic and other electric equipment, and Transportation equipment (p. 151 and Table 2 ).
Comparisons of plant size
Ramstetter ( Kong from developing countries were more than a third smaller than those from developed countries, although the differential with Japanese plants became much smaller at the end of the period. In Singapore, the differentials were much larger, more than half, and showed no decline over time.
In Thailand, in 1990, Ramstetter (1994) found that among firms from all investing countries, those from developed home countries were, on average, much larger than those from developing home countries. There were two expected exceptions, Textiles and apparel and Rubber and plastics, where the developing country affiliates were larger, on average. There were also two unexpected exceptions, Transport machinery and Precision machinery and miscellaneous manufacturing.
Part of the smaller average size of affiliates of developing country firms arises from the avoidance of small affiliates by developed country parents. That possibility is tested by
Ramstetter by excluding small affiliates and comparing average sales size only for medium to large firms. In this comparison, the affiliates of developed-country parents are again larger in most industries, now including both Textiles and Apparel and Rubber and plastics, but the other two exceptions remain.
Comparisons of productivity
One of the major topics of interest in comparisons of foreign-owned with locally-owned plants is productivity, either labor productivity or total factor productivity, but comparisons among countries of origin are more unusual. Takii (2011) , in a study on Indonesian manufacturing, found significantly higher productivity in plants representing FDI from the North (Japan) than in plants representing FDI from the South. The industry distribution of these differences is also of interest, because the exceptions to significant North productivity advantages were in Foods, Textiles, and Wood/Furniture, industries in which FDI from the South was most frequent. Ramstetter (1999) 
Additional comparisons of plant characteristics
Using the above described Indonesian plant level data, we made additional comparisons between North and South FDI that covers many of the aspects discussed above. The ratios of North to South in Table 7 Continuing with the other characteristics, it is seen that there is a large degree of differences between sectors but some general observations can be made. Firstly, North plants tend to pay higher blue-collar wages and to be more energy intensive than South plants.
Secondly, South plants tend to be more export oriented than North plants.
-- Table 7 about here--Singapore also provides data that enable a comparison of several aspects of FDI from developed and developing countries (Table 8) . Average output per worker in manufacturing plants in
Singapore owned by developed-country (Japan, the United States, and Europe) firms was more than 2&1/2 times the average in firms owned by firms from developing countries (All others).
Value added per worker was only 1&1/2 times as high. The difference between the output and value added measures suggests that affiliates of developed country firms were using a higher proportion of purchased inputs than affiliates of developing-country firms, perhaps because they were more deeply involved in worldwide production networks. Manufacturing establishments owned by developed country firms in all industries combined were about 25 percent larger, measured by employment, than those owned by developing-country firms. In addition to relative high productivity, firms from developed countries paid slightly higher wages. However, export shares and capital intensities were higher in firms from developing countries than in firms from developed countries.
-- Table 8 about here--
Comparisons of spillovers to local firms
One of the issues of greatest interest to host countries is the extent to which the technology brought to the host country by foreign investors is absorbed by local firms, an absorption that is referred to as "spillovers" to local firms. These could be spillovers to competing local firms in the same industries as the investors, who imitate the foreign firms' techniques, copy their products or methods of doing business, or learn from them in other ways, possibly by hiring away some of their employees. There could also be spillovers to firms that sell to the foreign firms, who may be willing to invest in improving the products of their local suppliers, or spillovers to customers, who gain from the availability of improved products and may be educated in their use by the foreign producers.
Although there are very few studies of spillovers that distinguish among sources of FDI, it is of interest that a meta-analysis of studies of spillovers in developing countries other than China found positive spillovers in 6 and mixed results in 3, all of which were for India. Of ten studies of China, considered a transition country rather than a developing country, eight found positive spillovers, one found a curvilinear relationship that had positive and negative segments, and one did not report either positive or negative results (Meyer and Sinani, 2009) .
A study by Buckley, Clegg, and Wang (2002) of manufacturing plants in China, compares the effects of the presence in an industry of affiliates of parents in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan with those of affiliates of parents in other countries, mainly the United States, Europe, and Japan. They found that the former had no effect on the productivity of locallyowned firms while that of the presence of the affiliates of parents in the latter group led to productivity gains in locally-owned firms. Du, Harrison, and Jefferson (2010) make a similar distinction of foreign firms in China.
They find little evidence of spillovers within the industries of investment, but strong evidence for spillovers to both supplying industries and customer industries. However, both effects take place from North-South FDI, but neither effect is observed from the FDI identified as South-South FDI. A later paper by the same authors (Du, Harrison, and Jefferson, 2011) confirms the findings for upstream and downstream spillovers and, more uncertainly, for horizontal spillovers. They suggest that the lack of spillovers from FDI from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macau suggests that much of that may really be round-tripping, rather than FDI. An additional finding is that FDI in firms benefiting from tax incentives to investing firms "generates greater productivity spillovers than unsubsidized firms." (p. 28).
Another The largest spillovers were from other Asian plants followed by spillovers from Japanese plants. There were no statistically significant spillovers from non-Asian plants. Hence, South FDI generates the largest spillovers and the most important distinction seems to be between Asian and non-Asian FDI rather than between North and South FDI.
Takii proposes two different explanations for a difference in the degree of spillovers. The first one is that other-Asian countries are at a development level more similar to that of Indonesia and spillovers might be largest when the technology differences between home and host countries are not too large. However, most Asian FDI comes, as we previously noted, from relatively developed Asian countries such as Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. Another proposed explanation is that the cultural distance between Asian countries and Indonesia is smaller than the cultural distance between non-Asian countries and Indonesia, and that a small cultural distance enhances spillovers.
Summary and concluding remarks
The rise in importance of South-South FDI within Asia seems well established, although the extent is blurred by the use of offshore financial centers and the inclusion of FDI from sovereign wealth funds and other sources that probably do not possess the intangible assets associated with FDI in the literature. Singapore, Economic Development Board (2009) 
